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Abstract In order to evaluate the claim that theistic belief can be explained away by science, 
four models of the relationship between science and theism are developed and their relevance 
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Introduction 
 
Explaining away arguments are very common in popular discussions about the relationship 
between science and God. Roughly speaking, the idea is that science not only explains 
features of the natural world, but that in doing so it also explains away God. Perhaps God was 
needed in the past to help us make sense of the world, but now science has provided 
alternative, better explanations. While science does not logically rule out God’s existence, it 
makes God redundant since there is no need for two explanations (God and science) when 
one (science) will do. Following Laplace, we no longer have need of the God hypothesis. 
 
Appealing as this line of reasoning might be, it cannot simply be assumed that only one 
explanation is needed, and so that explaining away occurs, without begging the question. If 
there are two suspects, Smith and Jones, for a particular crime, can it be assumed that if 
Smith is guilty then Jones is not? The answer is clearly no, as this will depend on such factors 
as whether Smith’s guilt would, on its own, account for all the relevant evidence and whether 
Smith and Jones typically work together.  
 
Criteria would be needed to determine whether explaining away occurs in a given context and 
this issue has been addressed using probability theory in both the artificial intelligence 
literature and in philosophy in the context of design arguments.
1
 In another paper, informal 
questions based on the formal approach were identified to help to determine whether 
explaining away occurs in a particular case and this approach was then applied to several 
science-religion debates.
2
 In the current volume, Rodney Holder applies this approach to 
contemporary debates in cosmology.
3
 
 
This paper explores explaining away in the context of cognitive science of religion (CSR). 
There has been a lot of discussion in this area about so-called debunking arguments which 
claim that scientific explanations of religious belief undermine the rationality of religious 
belief. Before addressing this issue, a brief review of explaining away will be presented; then 
four probabilistic models of the relationship between science and theism will be discussed 
and their relevance to explaining away explored. This work will then provide a foundation for 
addressing a debunking argument based on CSR. 
 
 
Review of Explaining Away 
 
Suppose that your car will not start. One possible explanation is that the battery is flat; 
another, that there is a fault with the starter motor. If an investigation reveals that the battery 
is indeed flat, this means that there is no longer any reason to think that there is a problem 
with the starter motor. Notice that the two hypotheses are compatible with each other. This 
means you could be very unlucky: there could be a problem with the battery and the starter 
motor. However, based on the evidence of the car not starting and the fact that the battery is 
flat, any reason for inferring a problem with the starter motor has gone. There is no need to 
infer two explanations (flat battery and faulty starter motor) when one will do (flat battery). 
The flat battery hypothesis has explained away the evidence for the faulty starter motor 
hypothesis. 
 
This scenario provides a simple example of explaining away, but it cannot be assumed that 
one explanation always removes the need for another explanation. The conditions under 
which explaining away occurs need to be determined. Previous work addressed this problem 
using a Bayesian approach and will now be reviewed briefly.
4
  
 
Consider a piece of evidence E and two hypotheses T and S that provide explanations of E. 
Suppose that E  increases the probability of (or confirms) T, i.e. P(T|E) > P(T). If the other 
hypothesis S is discovered to be true, what effect does that have on the initial hypothesis T? If 
the probability of T after both S and E are taken into account is lower than it was after only E 
was taken into account, then we say that ‘S explains away the evidence E for T’ or when the 
evidence E is taken for granted, ‘S explains away T’. Hence the condition for explaining 
away is:
5,6
 
 
P(T|S&E) < P(T|E).      (1) 
 
To make things more relevant to the present context, let T represent Theism, S represent 
Science and E the evidence of the natural world for which both theism and science might be 
considered to provide explanations. Supposing that E is taken into account to obtain the 
probability of theism T given E, P(T|E), then explaining away occurs if accepting science S in 
addition to the evidence E lowers the probability of T. 
 
Suppose that T and S are independent of each other to begin with, i.e. P(S|T) = P(S). In this 
case explaining away can be shown to occur if:  
 
P(E|T&S)×P(E|~T&~S) < P(E|~T&S)×P(E|T&~S).   (2) 
 
Explaining away in this case occurs along an indirect pathway via the evidence; T and S have 
no direct bearing on one another, but in light of the evidence E, learning that one hypothesis 
is true weakens the case for the other. This is how explaining away occurs in the car example. 
Assuming a flat battery has no bearing on whether there is a problem with the starter motor 
before the evidence (of the car not starting) is taken into account, it does have a bearing on it 
afterwards (it explains it away) due to the fact that it explains the evidence. 
 
If T and S are not independent then explaining away can be shown to occur if: 
 
P(E|T&S)×P(E|~T&~S)×P(S|T)×P(~S|~T) < P(E|~T&S)×P(E|T&~S)×P(S|~T)×P(~S|T). 
  (3) 
 
In this case, in addition to the indirect pathway, T and S can influence each other via a direct 
pathway, i.e. if there is a positive or negative dependence between them before the evidence 
E is taken into account. In the car example, this would be the case if, for example, having a 
flat battery caused a problem with the starter motor or else somehow ensured that the starter 
motor was working properly. Typically, both the direct and indirect pathways need to be 
taken into account to determine whether explaining away occurs.  
 
The direct and indirect pathways are closely related to epistemological relations of defeat.
7
 If 
the only influence between the hypotheses is a negative dependence along the direct pathway, 
then learning that one hypothesis is true would make the other less likely to be true and hence 
would constitute what is called a rebutting defeater for it. Similarly, a negative dependence 
along the indirect pathway is closely related to the relation of undercutting defeat. For 
example, the fact that the car does not start provides some reason to believe that there is a 
problem with the starter motor, but discovering that the battery is flat provides an 
undercutting defeater for that belief, i.e. it undercuts the reason for believing it. So explaining 
away could be thought of as a kind of explanatory defeat that combines both types of 
defeaters. However, approaching the issue  in terms of explaining away seems to have some 
advantages since both pathways need to be taken into account to get a clear picture and the 
Bayesian approach provides a suitable framework for combining the influences from both 
pathways and for establishing the conditions under which explaining away occurs.
8
 
 
Above, and in previous work, it has been assumed that the evidence confirms T so that P(T|E) 
> P(T), but even if that is not the case it still makes sense to say that S explains away T if the 
relevant conditions are satisfied. For example, some will doubt that the existence of complex 
life really confirmed theism before Darwin, but will still wish to maintain that evolution 
removes the need for God and hence explains away theism to at least some extent.  
 
 Four models of the relationship between theism and science 
 
In the literature on science and religion, various typologies or models of the relationship 
between them are often discussed. These models help us to conceptualize different ways of 
thinking about how science and religion can be related and how a range of topics might be 
approached from the perspective of the different models. Perhaps the best known 
classification is Ian Barbour’s fourfold typology consisting of i) conflict, ii) independence, 
iii) dialogue, and iv) integration.
9
 
 
Here too, four models are considered, but the goal is to characterize different probabilistic 
relationships between theism (T), science (S) and the evidence (E) for which both theism and 
science might be thought to provide explanations. Some of these models correspond to 
recognizable ways of thinking about how science and religion relate to each other that have 
been discussed elsewhere in the literature, but the purpose here is to provide a framework for 
thinking about explaining away that can then be used to address explaining away in the 
context of CSR. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates four ways in which T, S and E might be related. These relationships are 
represented using simple Bayesian networks where the absence of an edge between two 
nodes represents an independence relationship.
10
 Each of the four models, including the 
independence relationships, will be explained and discussed in turn.  
 
Independence Model 
 
In model 1 in figure 1(a), there is a probabilistic dependence between science and the 
evidence E (which will be assumed to be positive), but theism is independent of science and 
E. In this case, E does not provide any evidence for theism in the first place and science has 
no effect on theism either. In probabilistic terms, P(T|E&S) = P(T|E) = P(T) and hence 
explaining away cannot occur if this model is correct. Still, this highlights a response that 
some theists might offer to explaining away arguments. They will claim that it is a mistake to 
think of theism in terms of providing explanations for features of the natural world that might 
be amenable to scientific explanation and that science itself has no bearing on the existence 
of God. Such theists might reject all the arguments of natural theology, adopting some kind 
of fideism or perhaps argue that belief in God is properly basic, or they might appeal to the 
moral argument, for example, but whatever the case explaining away arguments have no 
force. For many theists, however, this response comes at too high a price since they wish to 
point to at least some features of the natural world as evidence for God.  
 
 
 Figure 1. Simple Bayesian networks for four different models for the relationship between 
Theism, T, Science, S and Evidence, E. (a) In model 1 T is independent of S and E. (b) 
Model 2 represents a causal chain where T and E are independent given S. (c) In model 3 T 
and S are unconditionally independent, but can become dependent given E. (d) In model 4 no 
independence relationships are assumed. 
 
 
Conditional Independence Model 
 
Figure 1(b) offers a second model for the relationship between T, S and E. This model differs 
from the first model in that theism is no longer considered to be independent of the evidence 
E. However, it is conditionally independent of E given science, i.e. P(T|E&S) = P(T|S), or 
equivalently it can be said that S screens off T from E. Again, it can be assumed that the 
relationship between science and the evidence E is positive, P(E|S) > P(E), and let us assume 
for the moment that the relationship between science and theism is positive so that P(S|T) > 
P(S). In this case T, S and E can be said to form a causal chain in the sense that the 
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probabilistic relationships between them are such as would typically be found in cases where 
T is a direct cause of S, S is a direct cause of E and T is not a direct cause of E. It is not clear 
what it means to say that science, S, causes evidence, E. However, if S is taken to represent 
scientific laws and the initial conditions of the universe, then this model would represent the 
idea that God acts indirectly in the world via secondary causes. In this case, it is easy to show 
that explaining away does not occur. First, note that the relationship between S and T can be 
expressed as P(T|S) > P(T|~S). Given the screening off condition, this can be expressed as 
P(T|E&S) > P(T|E&~S), from which it follows that P(T|E&S) > P(T|E) and so it is clear that 
explaining away does not occur. 
 
In the above discussion, it has been assumed that there is a positive direct relationship 
between science and theism, but that could be disputed. If it could be argued that there is a 
negative dependence, then the strategy for responding to explaining away arguments given 
above would not work. However, two important considerations need to be borne in mind. 
First, in this case it would not be the success of science in explaining the evidence that would 
lead to a problem for the theist, but rather the claim that science itself somehow directly 
undermines theism. In other words, explaining away would occur along the direct pathway; 
in this model, explaining away cannot occur along the indirect pathway via the evidence. 
 
In the case of science and theism, it is not clear what type of argument could show that 
science directly undermines theism. This brings us to the second point, which is that there are 
clear arguments that would tend to support a positive dependence between theism and 
science. An obvious example is that the orderly, law-like behaviour that makes science 
possible can be explained by the existence of a rational Creator. The point here is not to 
defend this argument, but to suggest that there are at least as good grounds for arguing for a 
positive direct dependence between theism and science as there are for arguing for a negative 
dependence. And if that is correct, model 2 provides an excellent way to think about science 
that avoids explaining away arguments.  
 
For many theists, this represents a very popular model for the relationship between science 
and theism. According to this model, it is the task of science to provide explanations for 
particular features of the natural world, but theism provides the context for science since it 
explains the existence of order in the universe, as expressed in the laws of nature, and why 
the universe is comprehensible.  
 
Model 2 seems to offer a very plausible response to explaining away arguments since it 
shows why explaining away does not work, but does so without making theism irrelevant to 
science. However, it might be argued that God does not merely act via the laws of nature, but 
guides natural processes in some way. For this reason, models involving a direct influence 
from T to E will now be considered. 
 
Indirect Conflict Model 
 
Now consider model 3 in figure 1(c). Here, theism and science are considered to be 
independent before the evidence E is taken into account, but unlike model 1 there is a 
probabilistic dependence between theism and E, which again can be taken to be positive so 
that when science is not taken into account E confirms theism. According to this model, it is 
very plausible to think that explaining away would occur since if theism and science are 
considered to offer reasonable explanations it seems likely that P(E|~T&~S) would be very 
low and so inequality (2) in section 2 would be expected to hold. Furthermore, if either 
hypothesis on its own makes the evidence highly probable so that P(E|~T&S) and P(E|T&~S) 
are both high, this again makes it likely that condition for explaining away would be satisfied. 
This model would be appropriate for the car example and so makes it clear why explaining 
away occurs in that case.  
 
In response to this, theists could claim that certain features of the natural world would be very 
unlikely from a scientific point of view in an atheistic universe, i.e. P(E|~T&S) is very low. 
However, assuming this is still greater than P(E|~T&~S), it seems likely that explaining away 
would still occur.
11
 Suffice it to say, model 3 provides the most significant scope for 
explaining away of the models considered so far.  
 
Indeed, model 3 provides a way for thinking about how conflict can arise between science 
and theism even when there is no intrinsic incompatibility between them (or even negative 
dependence before the evidence is taken into account). And, of course, the conflict can occur 
in two opposing ways. Here the assumption has been that science should be accepted and 
given this model, science might weaken the evidential case for theism to some extent. 
Equally, however, it shows how theists embracing this indirect conflict model could come to 
reject science (or aspects of it) since explaining away is symmetric and so insofar as they 
believe they have good independent reasons to accept theism, this could undermine science to 
some extent. Arguably, this indirect conflict model captures much better the perception of 
conflict between science and theism adopted by some theists and atheists than any model 
based on an intrinsic, logical incompatibility. 
 
Interdependence Model 
 
Many theists will consider model 3 to be seriously limited since they will wish to argue that 
there is a positive dependence between science and theism as discussed in the context of the 
conditional independence model (model 2). Hence, for such theists, model 4 in figure 1(d) 
will seem preferable. This model is a hybrid between models 2 and 3 and can be described as 
an interdependence model since T, S and E are all interdependent and it allows theism and 
science to be related in two different ways (directly and indirectly via the evidence). Like 
model 3, explaining away cannot be ruled out in principle, but this can be offset by a direct 
positive dependence between T and S. This model seems to capture the belief of many theists 
that God guides natural processes. It can also lead to additional support for theism compared 
with model 2 since evidence for theism from science need not be mediated solely through 
scientific theories.
12
  
 
Discussion 
 
Of the four models considered, it seems clear that there are plenty of options open to the 
theist to respond to explaining away arguments. Explaining away arguments will seem 
plausible if a framework such as model 3 is assumed, but it is far from clear that it is the best 
way to model the relationship between science and theism. Not surprisingly, this model 
seems to capture best how the New Atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, think about the 
relationship between science and theism. From the fact that science explains, it is often 
simply assumed, with no need for further argument, that it also explains away any need for 
God. It is also this model which gives rise to most conflict in the opposite direction, whereby 
theists might reject aspects of science. 
 
For the theist, model 1 avoids any problems, but comes at too high a price for many theists 
since theism is made completely independent of science and the evidence of the natural 
world. Model 4 does not preclude explaining away, but it has plenty of resources for 
responding to it and it also allows for the possibility of additional evidence for theism over 
and above any mediated through scientific theories. Model 2 offers the most straightforward 
way for theists to counter explaining away arguments. According to it, theism and science 
provide explanations in a way that precludes explaining away unless it can be shown that 
science directly undermines theism.  
 
This presents an enormous challenge for advocates of explaining away arguments. Merely 
pointing out how well science explains features of the natural world is completely inadequate 
and it is not at all clear how it could be shown that science directly undermines theism since 
there are plausible reasons for thinking that just the opposite is the case. 
 
The different models provide general ways of thinking about the relationship between science 
and theism and about the topic of explaining away. They will now be used to help address the 
question of explaining away in the cognitive science of religion. 
 
 
Application to Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) 
 
In recent years, there has been a lot of interest in CSR and evolutionary explanations for 
religious belief. The focus here is not on the details of the scientific explanations that have 
been proposed, but on their relevance for the rationality of religious belief.
13
 In this context, 
evolutionary debunking arguments aim to show that in light of evolutionary explanations of 
religious belief, such belief is irrational.
14
 As with evolutionary debunking arguments in 
general,
15
 the idea is that the processes that produce religious belief do not track truth and so 
even if no supernatural agents exist, people would still believe in them. 
 
Before discussing how this argument relates to explaining away, it is worth commenting on 
the objection that arguments of this kind against religious belief commit the genetic fallacy: 
CSR identifies the processes that produce religious beliefs, but this is irrelevant to the 
justification of religious beliefs. In a very insightful article, Joshua Thurow provides two 
responses to this objection.
16
 First, CSR concerns not just the origin of religious beliefs, but 
the reasons why they are continually held. Second, suppose someone comes to the conclusion 
that religious beliefs were produced by unreliable processes without good evidence and she 
has no other reasons for her beliefs, then her beliefs would no longer be justified. Hence, the 
origin of a belief can be relevant for the justification of the belief. 
 
With respect to the first point, even if cognitive science can explain why religious beliefs are 
currently held, that still seems like a separate issue from their justification. If there are good 
reasons for the truth of particular religious beliefs, that would provide a justification for their 
truth irrespective of the existence of processes that explain why people hold such beliefs. 
What this, together with Thurow’s second point, suggests is that CSR might in principle be 
able to undermine the justification of religious beliefs if they are held in a basic way, i.e. 
without any independent reasons to support them. This is brought out clearly by Matthew 
Braddock (this volume), who argues that religious beliefs are not justified ‘in the absence of 
independent evidence for their reliability’. Many will question whether religious beliefs held 
in a basic way could be justified at all, but this controversial view has been defended by 
Alvin Plantinga and other advocates of reformed epistemology.
17
 Thus, it seems plausible to 
view debunking arguments based on CSR as primarily targeting reformed epistemology or 
similar approaches to the rationality of religious belief. If this is correct, then an obvious 
strategy for religious believers is simply to accept that debunking arguments would work in 
the absence of independent reasons for their beliefs, but to maintain that there are in fact good 
reasons.
18,19
 
 
How does this kind of argument relate to explaining away? First, the point just mentioned 
also applies to explaining away arguments. Even if an explaining away argument against 
theism is successful, this does not mean that theism is false or irrational, but just that it has 
been undermined in the specific context under consideration. Hence, other independent 
reasons for theism could mean that it is still justified overall despite the success of an 
explaining away argument. Another point of contact with explaining away is that debunking 
arguments from CSR appeal to the truth of a scientific explanation, but as the earlier 
discussion showed the move from the truth of a scientific explanation to the claim that theism 
is thereby undermined or explained away is not straightforward. 
 
Insensitivity and Explaining Away 
 
To consider the relationship with explaining away further, consider a common CSR 
debunking argument which appeals to the insensitivity of the processes that produce religious 
beliefs.
20
 These processes are said to be insensitive if they would still result in religious 
beliefs even if those beliefs were false (for example, if no supernatural agents existed). If they 
are insensitive in this way, it is argued that we should suspend judgment in the reliability of 
the processes that give rise to religious beliefs and as a consequence we are not justified in 
holding such beliefs. 
 
Let T represent the existence of one or more supernatural agents, S that some CSR account is 
correct, and E the fact that people believe in the existence of supernatural agents. One could 
question whether S is true, but for the sake of argument we will assume that it is.
21
 In 
probabilistic terms, we can represent the insensitivity claim as P(E|T&S) = P(E|~T&S) since 
the truth or falsity of T has no bearing on E if S is true. This can be distinguished from the 
claim that that a CSR account of religious belief (S) explains away belief in the existence of 
supernatural agents (T) by explaining belief in such agents (E), which can be expressed 
probabilistically as P(T|S&E) < P(T|E), that S disconfirms T given E. A key point in what 
follows is that even if the insensitivity claim is true, the explaining away claim need not be.  
 
How does the insensitivity claim relate to the four models of the relationship between science 
and religion that we considered earlier? Interestingly, two of the models (1 and 2) already 
presuppose insensitivity. Model 1 will be considered later, but consider first the conditional 
independence model (model 2). According to this model, T and E are independent of each 
other given S and so the insensitivity claim holds. Does this lead to explaining away? This 
will be considered in the next subsection, but essentially it depends on whether there is a 
negative dependence between T and S, i.e. on whether P(S|T) < P(S). If there is not, then 
explaining away cannot occur, as discussed in the previous section, since this would 
constitute a causal chain from T to S to E. As also discussed there, this is a common way to 
think about the relationship between science and theism in general.  
 
This might seem puzzling. Insensitivity is typically linked with unreliability: if the process 
that produces a belief is insensitive to the truth of that belief, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that it is an unreliable process at producing beliefs of that kind. How could it be that learning 
the truth of S results in insensitivity and yet does not undermine belief in T via explaining 
away? The reason for this is that although there is a dependence between T and E, it is 
mediated via S. Once the truth of S is taken into account, it is S rather than E that is 
dependent on T and essentially this means that it is now S that is sensitive to the truth of T. 
 
This raises a question about the importance of insensitivity. Suppose God creates a process 
that generates beliefs in supernatural agents. If we imagine the very same process, but in a 
universe where there are no supernatural agents but otherwise everything is the same, then it 
will presumably still generate beliefs in supernatural agents. The process will be insensitive 
since it will result in the same beliefs whether God exists or not, but how is this relevant 
since, in fact, God created the process? The important question is not whether the process is 
insensitive, but whether the process would be likely to exist in the absence of God’s 
existence. Ultimately, the question is whether the process undermines belief in supernatural 
agents given the existence of such beliefs. In other words, it is a question about whether 
explaining away occurs. 
 
Consider an analogy. Suppose I receive an email from my friend telling me that he will meet 
me for lunch at 1pm and so I come to hold that belief. It is indeed true that if I had somehow 
received the very same email, but it had not been sent by my friend, I would still have come 
to hold the same belief. Clearly, my belief is insensitive to the origin of the message, but that 
is not relevant. What is relevant is how likely I am to receive such a message if it had not 
been sent by my friend.
22
  
 
Suppose, however, that God creates a process that does not simply generate beliefs in 
supernatural agents, but instead enables me to detect whether they exist. If the very same 
process were to generate beliefs in supernatural agents even if they did not exist, insensitivity 
would be more of an issue and could lead to explaining away. Even then, we would need to 
consider other factors such as whether the process would be more likely to exist given God’s 
existence in order to determine whether explaining away actually occurs.  
 
A possible objection to the line of reasoning presented here is that it is not the fact (if it is a 
fact) of insensitivity, but the awareness of insensitivity, in the absence of independent 
reasons for belief in God, that presents a problem for the theist. As we shall see below, 
however, even if one accepts the insensitivity claim, further reasons are needed for thinking 
that explaining away occurs even in the absence of other reasons for belief in God. 
 
Does Explaining Away Occur? 
 
According to the independence model (model 1), T is probabilistically irrelevant to both S 
and E. We have already raised questions about the adequacy of this model in general, but it 
seems particularly weak in the current context since E is concerned with religious beliefs. 
Even if it can be argued that T is probabilistically irrelevant to the sort of evidence that 
supports scientific theories in general, this seems much less plausible when the evidence in 
question concerns beliefs about T. Arguably a more plausible approach in the spirit of model 
1 might be to say that E depends on T, but that S is independent of T and E. In other words, 
science cannot explain religious belief and so CSR is a non-starter. However, even if one is 
suspicious about aspects of the explanations offered by CSR, this move is much too sceptical. 
For this reason, model 1 and this variant of it will not be considered further. 
 
Before discussing the other model which presupposes the insensitivity claim (model 2), let us 
consider the indirect conflict model (model 3). According to this model, T and S both have a 
direct influence on E, but there is no direct influence of T on S. First, let us suppose that the 
insensitivity claim does in fact hold, P(E|T&S) = P(E|~T&S). Would this result in explaining 
away? The condition for explaining away is given by (2). Assuming that in the absence of 
any acceptable CSR account, T would make E more likely, i.e. P(E|T&~S) > P(E|~T&~S), 
then the condition for explaining away would be met. Hence, granting the truth of S, or even 
evidence in favour of S, and the insensitivity claim, this would lead to explaining away.  
 
So although insensitivity and explaining away are distinct, they are closely related in model 3 
so that essentially whether explaining away occurs amounts to asking whether the 
insensitivity claim holds. Unlike models 1 and 2, it does not necessarily hold in this model. 
Whether it holds depends essentially on whether T adds anything to the account of E 
provided by S. Murray and Schloss argue that things might have been very different if God 
does not exist (and hence T is false).
23
 For example, it may well be that in the absence of God 
there would be no physical universe or no fine-tuning of the universe and so no intelligent 
beings with beliefs in supernatural agents, i.e. E would be false. If this is used in response to 
the insensitivity claim, however, it faces a problem, as both Thurow and Braddock point out. 
The insensitivity claim is concerned not simply with whether beliefs in supernatural agents 
would occur in the absence of any supernatural agents, but whether they would occur in the 
absence of supernatural agents if the processes specified in S were still in operation. This 
relates to the probability P(E|~T&S). In the last sub-section, the importance of the 
insensitivity claim was questioned, but it is still relevant in determining whether explaining 
away occurs, particularly for model 3. 
 
Another possible objection to the insensitivity claim is that T may contribute to the 
occurrence of E, perhaps by God’s guiding the processes specified in S to bring about E (or 
some subset of E relating to monotheistic beliefs). Matthew Braddock objects to this move on 
the grounds that it is question-begging since the guidance belief presupposes reliability of the 
belief in supernatural agents.
24
 Given that the guidance claim amounts to the probabilistic 
claim that P(E|T&S) > P(E|~T&S), and so contradicts the insensitivity claim, it does not 
require the belief that God guides the relevant processes, but that if God exists (or more 
generally, if T is true), then E (or some subset thereof) would be more likely to occur. In 
response to Braddock’s objection, this means that it does not presuppose the reliability of 
belief in supernatural agents, but would be based on reasoning about what God (or other 
supernatural agents) would be likely to do. If such a case can be made, it would provide a 
reason for doubting the claim that such belief is unreliable.
25
   
 
While questioning the insensitivity claim by appealing to guidance or in other ways might be 
an option, the goal is not to defend any of these approaches here. Suffice it to say that insofar 
as a case for insensitivity can be made, it does have scope for explaining away within model 
3. This is not surprising since, as we saw in the last section, the indirect conflict model has 
most scope for explaining away to occur in general. It is also a very questionable model of 
the relationship between science and theism. 
 
Consider now the conditional independence model (model 2) and recall from the earlier 
discussion that it presupposes insensitivity. According to this model, explaining away will 
occur if S is negatively dependent on T, P(S|T) < P(S), but not otherwise. This is where the 
response of Murray and Schloss seems more relevant. If God does not exist (and hence T is 
false), it may well be that there would be no physical universe or no fine-tuning or no life, 
and so no CSR processes, and hence S would be false. In other words, Murray and Schloss’ 
response would be relevant, not to the insensitivity claim, but to whether explaining away 
occurs. 
 
Several objections to the sort of strategy suggested by Murray and Schloss can be made. Most 
obviously, the suggestion that there might be a positive dependence between S and T could 
be disputed. It seems to rest on contested claims of natural theology pertaining to whether a 
physical, fine-tuned universe with intelligent life would be more likely to exist given the 
existence of God. However, the onus is not on the critics of explaining away to establish a 
positive dependence of S on T, but on its proponents to establish a negative dependence if an 
argument for explaining away is to be made.  
 
Appeals to natural theology could also give rise to another objection. Recall that debunking 
arguments are primarily concerned with religious beliefs that are held in a basic, non-
inferential way and so insofar as this response depends on natural theology it deviates from 
that position. In response, it can be noted that this highlights the limitation of debunking 
arguments since religious believers need not be restricted to thinking about their beliefs in 
non-inferential terms. Moreover, even someone who adopts this non-inferential position 
could still reason about what the universe would be expected to be like given God’s existence 
or the absence of God’s existence. The point would not be to justify belief in God’s existence 
on the basis of such reasoning, but it could be used to address potential defeaters of their 
beliefs as in the current context. This is particularly relevant here since the onus is on the 
proponent of explaining away to establish negative dependence between S and T. If this 
cannot be established, there is no good reason to think that explaining away occurs. 
 
The interdependence model (model 4) is a hybrid of models 2 and 3, and so the issues 
discussed in relation to those models are also relevant to it. If the insensitivity claim holds, 
that could enhance the prospects for explaining away, but even if that is the case a positive 
dependence between S and T could outweigh it. Again, it would not be necessary to establish 
a strong positive dependence in order to respond to the claim that explaining away occurs. It 
would only need to be maintained that the sorts of arguments that might be offered in favour 
of positive dependence between S and T are sufficient to compensate for arguments that 
might be offered for insensitivity.  
 
In summary, the independence model (model 1) does not seem like an appropriate model to 
adopt in the context of CSR. The conditional independence model (model 2) offers a 
straightforward way to respond to debunking arguments. It presupposes the insensitivity 
claim, but avoids explaining away unless it can be shown that there is a negative dependence 
between S and T. Since various arguments of natural theology would be relevant to this 
question, it is difficult to see how explaining away could be established in this case without 
refuting these arguments. Not surprisingly, as in the general context of explaining away 
arguments, the indirect conflict model (model 3) offers the best prospects for an explaining 
away argument to succeed in the context of CSR. If it can be shown that the insensitivity 
claim is correct, then it seems likely that explaining away would occur if this model is 
adopted. Finally, the interdependence model (model 4) combines aspects of models 2 and 3. 
Like model 3, it does provide some scope for explaining away, but like model 2 it also has 
resources to avoid it. 
 
Discussion 
 
So far E has been taken to be a general belief in the existence of supernatural agents. If E is 
taken to include more specific religious beliefs, it can affect parts of the argument. For 
example, whether God might guide the processes involved in CSR could be affected by what 
the target belief is. Furthermore, it is also relevant to how people go about forming their 
beliefs. As Joshua Thurow argues, if Christian belief is considered, people might cite a 
variety of reasons in its favour such as the world seeming to be designed, religious 
experiences, answers to prayer, having witnessed a miracle, evidence relating to early 
Christianity and the resurrection of Jesus.
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 He accepts that CSR shows that if humans lacked 
these kinds of reasons, it is likely we would still have some sort of religious beliefs. 
However, to show that people’s religious beliefs are unjustified, he argues that it would be 
necessary to show that the processes they actually use are unreliable and that would require 
showing that the kinds of reasons cited above are unjustified. His point is that such a 
conclusion could not be established by CSR, but only by assessing the reasons in question. 
 
This point is certainly relevant to the question of explaining away. Provisionally, it was 
accepted that some CSR belief account is correct (S), but if the processes considered in CSR 
fail to include important processes involved in the production of religious belief, then S could 
be called into question and that would clearly be detrimental to explaining away. 
Alternatively, S could be accepted, but would now only account for some of the relevant 
evidence excluding the existence of the kinds of reasons for belief noted by Thurow. As such, 
S would have no scope to explain away T insofar as it fails to account for the additional 
evidence. 
 
The focus so far has been on debunking arguments based on insensitivity, but Matthew 
Braddock has proposed a novel argument from false gods. Basically, the idea is that we 
should suspend judgment in the reliability of CSR mechanisms because they give rise to a 
large percentage of false god beliefs. While a detailed response to his argument is beyond the 
scope of this article, several points can be made. As noted earlier, Braddock makes it clear 
that his argument applies to religious beliefs that are formed in a basic, non-inferential way. 
While this strengthens the argument, it reduces its scope and, like the insensitivity arguments, 
means that an obvious way to respond to it is by offering reasons for belief in God or other 
religious beliefs. Some other points brought up in response to insensitivity arguments are also 
relevant. For example, if the CSR mechanisms appealed to are more likely to occur in a 
theistic universe than an atheistic one, this could compensate for any undermining of theism 
that might be thought to occur, just as in explaining away arguments.  
 
The points that follow assume, as Braddock does, the legitimacy of taking belief in God to be 
basic, at least provisionally. Let us grant the conclusion of the first stage of Braddock’s 
argument: that we should suspend judgment about the reliability of CSR mechanisms with 
respect to god beliefs. Braddock addresses an objection due to Leech and Visala
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 that 
although CSR mechanisms may be unreliable, they comprise only part of the full causal 
pathway leading to belief in supernatural agents and so the complete belief-forming process 
may still be reliable. He responds by arguing that CSR mechanisms are significant 
contributors to god beliefs (premise 7) and that  
 
if we should suspend judgment about the reliability of significant contributors to a 
belief-forming process P with respect to a class of beliefs C, and we have no good 
reason to think other significant contributors would confer reliability upon P with 
respect to C, then we should suspend judgment about the reliability of P with respect 
to C” (premise 8) 
  
Those who consider religious belief to be basic and non-inferential typically claim that if 
there is a God, belief in God is likely to be warranted in a basic way, but that if there is no 
God, belief in God is likely not to be warranted in a basic way. Since they consider God to be 
an indispensable factor in the reliability of the process and yet CSR mechanisms exclude 
God, they might argue that CSR is irrelevant to their position. Granting premise (7) of 
Braddock’s argument, this means that premise (8) could be questioned. That is, granting that 
CSR mechanisms are a significant contributor to the belief forming process, suspending 
judgment about their reliability would not require suspending judgment about the belief-
forming process since its reliability was not attributed to CSR mechanisms in the first place.
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Would good reasons not need to be given for thinking that other significant factors would 
confer reliability as Braddock requires? This would seem to be required if the reliability of 
the belief is attributed to CSR mechanisms, but if it is not, then it is difficult to see why 
suspending judgment about their reliability would require such reasons to be provided.  
 
Essentially, this means that premise (8) would need to be modified to replace ‘we have no 
good reason to think other significant contributors would confer reliability’ with ‘we have 
good reason to think no other significant contributors would confer reliability’. In principle, 
perhaps CSR could provide support for this claim if it could be shown that all the belief-
forming processes could be accounted for by CSR mechanisms. However, Thurow’s point 
about the sorts of reasons cited in favour of particular religious beliefs, such as Christian 
beliefs, suggests that CSR mechanisms are only part of the causal pathway and leave out 
potentially important components that might confer reliability. Whether these other 
components are reliability-conferring is not something that can be established by CSR. 
 
It might be argued that the sorts of factors cited by Thurow are irrelevant to Braddock’s 
argument since it is concerned with beliefs formed in a non-inferential way. However, insofar 
as these factors are used by religious believers, it could be argued that CSR mechanisms fail 
to account for all the relevant evidence about the belief-forming process. Braddock considers 
testimony as a potential mechanism that could confer reliability with respect to religious 
beliefs, but then asks where the beliefs of the original testifiers come from. He argues that if 
CSR mechanisms plausibly contributed to their beliefs and if we are not aware of any other 
factors that could plausibly have conferred reliability, then we should doubt the reliability of 
their beliefs. While this response seems reasonable for some types of religious belief where 
CSR mechanisms may well account for all the relevant evidence, it seems much less 
plausible if one is considering, for example, the historical origins of Christian belief. One 
could certainly doubt that CSR mechanisms are all that relevant when dealing with such 
historical contexts and also provide reasons for thinking that the testimonial evidence is 
reliable. Such reasons could call into question premise (9) of Braddock’s argument, that “we 
have no good reason to think other significant contributors to our belief-forming processes 
would confer reliability upon them with respect to the class of god beliefs.”29 This premise 
could be questioned even by those who hold a non-inferential approach to religious belief. 
According to this view, such reasons would not be considered necessary to justify the 
religious beliefs in question, but may well be sufficient to respond to debunking arguments 
based on CSR.
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 Whether or not the testimonial evidence in question is reliable, the point is 
that it is very doubtful that appealing to CSR mechanisms is the right way to proceed.   
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Explaining away has been investigated in CSR, particularly in the context of a debunking 
argument against theism based on the insensitivity of the processes that give rise to theistic 
beliefs. To provide an appropriate framework, previous work on explaining away was 
reviewed and then a number of models of the relationship between science and theism were 
considered in terms of their relevance to explaining away arguments. 
 
In terms of the debunking argument, a number of points can be made in summary. It is not 
immediately clear that the argument avoids the charge of committing the genetic fallacy. 
Most plausibly, it can be construed as targeting theistic beliefs formed in a basic and non-
inferential way, but this invites the obvious response that there are many reasons for belief in 
God which need to be evaluated on their own terms rather than by appealing to CSR 
explanations of religious belief. Furthermore, since many believers do appeal to reasons for 
their beliefs it is very doubtful that CSR can explain all the relevant evidence and, a fortiori, 
very doubtful that explaining away arguments even get off the ground. 
 
Even if these concerns are set aside, it is still not clear that explaining away arguments are 
likely to be successful. An important point is that the insensitivity claim must be 
distinguished from that of explaining away. In particular, even if the insensitivity claim is 
true, it does not follow that CSR mechanisms explain away theistic beliefs. In light of the 
four models of the relationship between science and theism, by far the most plausible case for 
explaining away occurs in the indirect conflict model, which the theist has good reason to 
reject in any case. In the two plausible models, there are plenty of resources for the theist to 
avoid explaining away. Overall, the prospects for explaining away of religious belief from 
CSR seem very limited. 
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